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Positing levels of explanation has played an important role in philosophy of science. This facilitated the 
advocacy of antireductionism of explanations, which, at its most basic, is the idea that scientific 
explanations citing large (i.e. non-microphysical) entities will persist. The idea that explanations come in 
levels captures important features of explanatory practices, and it also does well at helping to define 
different positions one might take regarding explanatory reductionism or anti-reductionism. Yet the idea 
that explanations come in levels has also led philosophers astray. This systematically misconstrues the 
relationship different explanations bear to one another, suggests candidate explanations are less 
numerous than they in fact are, and occludes recognition of how the selection of explanations can vary 
across research projects. Antireductionists about explanation should move on from talk of levels. Or so I 
will argue.  
 
“Entities at different levels;” “explanations in higher-level terms;” “the fundamental level;” “higher-level 
sciences.” These and many similar turns of phrase are used throughout philosophy of science and 
metaphysics, typically without much in the way of explication. These are used as starting points for 
discussions rather than the endpoints of argument. The present volume is no exception to this common 
approach. By what right are such turns of phrase used? Best I can tell, the rationale for such levels talk is 
taken to stem from (variously) the mere fact of productive scientific inquiry addressing objects larger 
than fundamental particles; that scientists of various stripes invoke levels on a regular basis; that some 
scientific investigations target the very smallest happenings in our world, happenings that seem bound 
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up in one way or another with everything that goes on in our world; that philosophers, scientists, and 
laypeople alike often have whole discourses without making reference to these smallest goings-on; that 
there are sometimes multiple candidate explanations of a single explanandum, some of which feature 
larger entities and their properties than others.  
 I have done the same. In a 2010 paper on levels of explanation, I simply say, “In general, a 
lower-level explanation cites properties of objects that stand in a part-whole relationship to objects 
referenced in the competing higher-level explanation” (Potochnik, 2010, p.64), and I reference lots of 
important philosophers who talked about scientific explanations in this way. Since then, I have started 
to examine this assumption that explanations come in levels more carefully and to attend to others who 
are also questioning this. I have been startled at how little weight these turns of phrase and the 
assumption behind them can actually bear. And yet, the assumption that explanations come in levels 
mostly persists as an unexamined starting point of philosophical treatments of explanation. Levels of 
explanation receive plenty of discussion, but the discussion largely consists in whether there are higher-
level explanations and, if so, what relationship they bear to what we know, or might someday know, 
about the smallest, microphysical happenings in our world. As far as I can tell, levels of organization 
mostly still go uncontested.  
 In this paper, I will argue that it is a mistake to invoke levels in discussions of explanation in 
particular. The invocation of levels played a very important role historically in philosophy of science, as a 
way to motivate an antireductionist stance about scientific explanation. But our scientific and 
philosophical understanding has progressed mightily since then, and we can do antireductionism better. 
It is thus time for philosophers of science to abandon the levels framework in our discussions of 
scientific explanation.  
In Section 1, I outline the role invocation of levels has played in philosophy of science, focusing 
especially on how they have been used to motivate antireductionism about scientific explanations. In 
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Section 2, I argue that framing antireductionism about scientific explanation as a thesis about levels of 
explanation has led to problematic commitments—that candidate explanations form a linear or at least 
partial hierarchy, can be ordered by generality, and bear straightforward metaphysical relationships to 
one another. In Section 3, I use the difficulties of the levels framing to show how antireductionism can 
be done better without levels. This involves reconsidering the relationships different explanations bear 
to one another, recognizing a wider variety of candidate explanations, and appreciating how 
considerations guiding the selection of explanations can vary across research projects. Finally, in Section 
4, I conclude by offering a new ‘working hypothesis’ about the nature of our scientific explanations: 
They are many and varied, often featuring large-scale, distant, and structural factors. The decision of 
explanatory quality is not about how fine-grained our characterization of local factors should be but 
rather which factors at what scales we should attend to. Reductionism has failed, but so too has the 
framework of explanatory levels. The levels framing is no longer necessary nor helpful in motivating 
antireductionism about scientific explanation.  
 
1. Levels in Antireductionism 
There is tradition in philosophy, as well as in at least some fields of science, to invoke levels on both 
sides of debates about reductionism. In philosophy, this tradition traces back at least to Oppenheim and 
Putnam’s influential motivation for the unity of science understood as reduction to physics.1 Oppenheim 
 
1 Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) also consider levels of explanation, but there levels of explanation are 
not compositionally defined but defined in terms of abstractness: “higher levels [of explanation] require 
the use of more or less abstract theoretical constructs which function in the context of some 
comprehensive theory” (147). Their illustration is explaining a planet’s position with reference to 
Kepler’s laws (lower level) or instead from the general law of gravitation and laws of motion (higher 
level). Indeed, a strategy of high-level explanation on which Hempel and Oppenheim focus is “explaining  
a class of phenomena by means of a theory concerning their micro-structure,” so the usage of ‘levels’ is 
very different from the later Oppenheim and Putnam paper. Thus, although the connection between 
high-level explanation and greater abstractness that has been influential is established in this paper, the 
relationship of levels to explanatory reductionism is reversed from what is customary in later 
philosophical discussions.  
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and Putnam’s levels are, in descending order: social groups, multicellular living things, cells, molecules, 
atoms, and elementary particles. The relation among entities at different levels is one of part-whole 
composition:  
Any whole which possesses a decomposition into parts all of which are on a given level, will be 
counted as also belonging to that level. Thus each level includes all higher levels. However, the 
highest level to which a thing belongs will be considered the “proper” level of that thing” (1958, 
9,10).  
Note that this is not an endpoint of their analysis, but rather the starting point. That is, Oppenheim and 
Putnam presume this is how our world is ordered—as wholes entirely decomposable into parts occupied 
at a lower-level—and then investigate what relation we should expect among the fields of science that 
investigate these levels. They predict, based on empirical evidence of how science seemed to them to be 
proceeding, that all science would eventually be reduced to microphysics—that is, loosely put, that our 
best scientific laws would be vindicated and analyzable in terms of microphysical laws.2  
A decade and a half later, Fodor (1974) responds directly to Oppenheim and Putnam’s ‘working 
hypothesis’ of the unity of science with the opposed hypothesis of disunity, i.e., the failure to reduce 
explanations or theories to physical theory. His argument rests on the observation that there is not 
often a neat relationship between kinds invoked in higher-level explanations and the physical kinds 
upon which they depend: “interesting generalizations can often be made about events whose physical 
descriptions have nothing in common” (103). Thus enters the influential idea of multiple realization, and 
with it the presumption that high-level properties are realized by lower-level properties. We can also 
credit Fodor with the diagram in Figure 1, variants of which have proliferated ever since in discussions of 
the significance of realization and multiple realization for explanation and causation. Around the same 
 
2 For discussion of a very different and largely neglected tradition of the unity of science tracing back to 
the Vienna Circle, see Potochnik (2011). 
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time, Putnam (1975) emphasized the value of the generality of higher-level explanations compared to 
lower-level explanations, deploying the now-classic example of explaining why a square peg failed to go 
through a round hole with the same diameter. And Garfinkel (1981) argued that explanation "seeks its 
own level,” that the factors that truly made a difference to some occurrence are found at the same 
level. For Garfinkel, reductive explanations thus suggested sensitivity to details that were in fact 
irrelevant.  
Figure 1: Fodor's illustration of why reduction of scientific explanations is unlikely to come to pass. 
The idea that higher-level explanations are more general or more abstract than lower-level 
explanations has since become very influential. Often the justification given is in terms of multiple 
realization, as in Fodor’s influential argument and diagram. Yablo (1992) employs this idea in his 
proportionality argument for mental causation. Sober (1999) employs the framework of multiple 
realization giving rise to different levels of explanation to support a pluralism about explanatory 
strategies, including lower- and higher-level explanations that are more specific and more general 
respectively. Jackson and Pettit (1992) deploy a different approach from Sober’s to defend a similar 
pluralism in favor of both more general higher-level explanations and more specific lower-level 
explanations. Hauge (2010) and Clarke (2015) each analyzes what specific variety of abstractness might 
be at play in distinguishing high-level from lower-level explanations.  
This combination of ideas has become a general setup for antireductionism about scientific 
explanation: Candidate explanations come in levels; entities that feature in lower-level explanations 
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compose the entities that feature in higher-level explanations; properties cited in lower-level 
explanations determine and multiply realize the properties cited in higher-level explanations; higher-
level explanations are more general than lower-level explanations. Arguments in favor of mental 
causation (e.g. Yablo, 1992) and of metaphysical emergence (e.g. Wilson, 2013) defend not just the 
explanatory but the causal autonomy of higher-level properties conceived in this way. Mechanistic 
accounts of explanation have a conception of mechanisms consistent with this general setup and deploy 
it as a competing view to explanatory reductionism (e.g. Craver, 2007).  
Discussions of complexity as a bulwark against reductionism also presume this general setup. 
Here is Herbert Simon, in his classic discussion of complexity and systems theory:  
The central theme that runs through my remarks is that complexity frequently takes the form of 
hierarchy, and that hierarchic systems have some common properties that are independent of 
their specific content. Hierarchy, I shall argue, is one of the central structural schemes that the 
architect of complexity uses. 
By a hierarchic system, or hierarchy, I mean a system that is composed of interrelated 
subsystems, each of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest 
level of elementary subsystem (1962, 468).  
William Wimsatt propounded this style of view of levels in philosophy of science, famously describing 
levels as “local maxima of regularity and predictability” (Wimsatt, 1972; 2007). This version of 
antireductionism has differences from the philosophical tradition I surveyed above, but it also resonated 
with that tradition and has regularly been treated as an allied position. Wimsatt has his own diagram, 
one that has been more influential in some circles than Fodor’s illustration of multiple realization; see 
Figure 2.  
 And, so the idea that explanations come in levels, as perhaps also do causes and organizational 
relationships, has become entrenched as a key assumption of antireductionism about scientific 
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Figure 2: Wimsatt’s illustration of levels of organization. 
 
explanation. My survey here has traversed a few different debates and traditions, and it is certainly 
incomplete. Across the philosophical discussions of levels, several related concepts of levels are 
variously at play, and often several are invoked without carefully distinguishing among them.3 There is 
one important distinction in conceptions of levels I want to point out at this juncture: some are 
metaphysical while others are representational. That is, some conceptions of levels regard the entities, 
properties, or processes in our world—as with claims about levels of organization or high-level 
causation—whereas others regard our representations of our world—as with claims about the relative 
abstractness of levels or the levels of our scientific theories. Claims about level relationships among 
fields of science or of scientific laws seem to lurk somewhere in between metaphysical and 
 
3 See Potochnik (2017, Chapter 6; forthcoming) for more on the variety of levels concepts and how these 
have been conflated. 
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representational commitments.4 
Here is an attempt at a generic formulation that perhaps can accommodate all of this variety in 
the invocation of levels. Most broadly, the antireductionist position about levels of explanation seems to 
presume that (1) the world is organized into levels, such that (2) our candidate explanations are 
structured in terms of levels, which motivates (3) the persistence of different fields of science addressing 
these various levels. This seems to give full voice to the antireductionist impulse, even if my 
characterization is abstract and rough in order to lump rather than split. This style of argument for 
antireductionism has also shown up in philosophical debates about specific scientific investigations, 
including at least physics, biology, psychology, cognitive science, and the social sciences. The ultimate 
concerns of these debates vary. In psychology and cognitive science, at issue is whether there is room 
for mental states as explanations or even as real, causally efficacious components of our world. In 
physics and biology, the question is how different approaches relate to one another and to other fields 
entirely, chiefly fundamental physics. In the social sciences, the chief question seems to be social 
explanations, i.e. explanations citing entities larger that individual agents. Across all these fields, the 
invocation of levels to counter reductionism also seems to be in service to a stance on methodology or 
proper modeling approach. And even when what is at stake has varied, in broad strokes, these debates 
have had remarkably similar contours.  
 
2. What the Levels Framework Gets Wrong About Explanation 
 
4 A second difference in levels conceptions that can cause confusion is whether (metaphysical) levels are 
a relation among types or between types and tokens. In this discussion, I presume the former. Even if 
there is a type-token basis for levels, each token is of many types—i.e. can be categorized with the use 
of multiple different descriptions—and levels have often been invoked to describe the relationships 
among those types. Additionally, all fields of science, including fundamental physics, target types rather 
than tokens.  
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So, a variety of forms of antireductionism about explanation, developed in a variety of philosophical 
contexts, resist explanatory reductionism by invoking levels. This might seem like an obvious strategy. 
One might think that all that’s needed from the invocation of levels in a project of antireductionism is a 
way to gesture at the idea that there is other than the most fundamental: that there is something other 
than microphysical happenings in the world; that our scientific enterprise involves more than 
fundamental physics; that our scientific laws encompass more than fundamental physical laws; that our 
scientific explanations come in more varieties than microphysical explanations. But when one puts this 
point in terms of levels, much more is taken on board than just this. And, I will suggest in this section, 
what is taken on board is philosophically problematic. Framing debates about explanation in terms of 
levels of explanation systematically misconstrues the relationship different explanations bear to one 
another.  
 To get at this point, let’s start by taking one step back from the levels framework. What is not 
controversial is that potential explanations come in varieties. A variety of physical and chemical theories 
and models bear on the behavior of gases; genes are investigated with different methods in several 
subfields of biology; and behavioral phenomena are targeted in studies ranging from neuroscience and 
molecular genetics to ecological psychology and sociology. Various scientific projects that target the 
same phenomena generate varieties of potential explanations. I say ‘potential explanations’ in order to 
remain neutral on the question of whether all succeed as explanations. Indeed, reductionism is the view 
that some of these varieties of potential explanations are universally privileged epistemically and/or 
metaphysically over the others—or will be so at a future stage of science. Antireductionism is the 
rejection of that universal privilege.  
Characterizing varieties of potential explanations as levels of explanation entails that the 
varieties occur in a linear hierarchy or, at the very least, a partial hierarchy. Accounts of levels of 
explanation tend to presume that potential explanations for some explanandum are either lower level 
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than, higher level than, or at the same level as any other potential explanations (for that explanandum). 
This just is the idea that explanations are arranged in levels. It is possible, though, that levels of 
explanation is a partial hierarchy, that is, that some potential explanations for a given explanandum are 
at incomparable levels, while others are related by lower-level-than, higher-level-than, or same-level-as. 
Invocations of levels of explanation have also tended to presume, in line with Fodor’s diagram (Figure 1), 
that there is a many-one relationship among explanations at different levels in their application to 
related explananda. Higher-level explanations have often been taken to be more general, i.e., to apply 
to explananda across a greater range of circumstances, and lower-level explanations to be more specific, 
i.e. to apply across a more limited range of circumstances (see, e.g., Putnam, 1975; Garfinkel, 1981; 
Jackson and Pettit, 1992; Sober, 1999). The entities or properties referenced in the different levels of 
explanation are also supposed to bear special relationships to one another: parts and wholes (e.g. 
Putnam, 1975), sub-components and components of mechanisms (e.g. Craver and Bechtel, 2007), 
determination (e.g. Yablo, 1992), supervenience (e.g. Kim, 1998), or realization (e.g. Fodor, 1974). Across 
this variety, it seems higher-level explanations are supposed to reference something that (in one way or 
another) depends upon what’s referenced in lower-level explanations.  
But the varieties of potential explanations for a given explanandum are seldom if ever arranged 
in any of these ways. Consider the three commitments described just above in reverse order. Do 
varieties of potential explanations reference properties or entities that are connected by dependence 
relations (e.g. composition, determination, supervenience, or realization)? Examples philosophers 
appeal to in debates about explanatory reductionism tend to have this form. Fodor (1974) contrasts 
Gresham’s Law governing monetary exchanges with imagined lower-level explanations of exchanges of 
wampum, dollar bills, and a signed check. Putnam (1975) contrasts the geometric explanation for the 
square peg not going through round hole with an explanation in terms of the individual atomic structure 
of the peg and of the edges of the hole. Garfinkel (1981) contrasts the Lotka-Volterra account of the 
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increasing fox population with an explanation in terms of individual fox and hare births and predation 
events. An exchange of something valued as currency is required for any monetary exchange; precise 
atomic structure dictates size relations; individual births and deaths combine to determine population 
growth. But something is a bit fishy about the lower-level candidate explanations in all of these 
examples. Namely, these potential explanations are not actually types of explanation generated in 
scientific research. Where is the scientific research on wampum exchanges (or signed-check exchanges), 
on the precise atomic structure of a specific one-inch sided peg, or on the births and deaths of foxes and 
hares in a specific population? Without the existence of such research, we can’t expect these examples 
to inform our judgments on how to choose among a variety of potential explanations.  
In contrast, in situ examples of potential explanations for a given explanandum do not tend to 
have this form. Behavioral phenomena—say, a tendency to heightened aggression—are investigated in 
a range of different fields (Longino, 2013). Neuroscience identifies neural structures and pathways 
associated with this tendency; molecular genetics identifies genes associated with the tendency; 
ecological psychology and sociology identify social and environmental influences. Patently, none of 
these explanations for heightened aggression is related to another by composition, determination, 
supervenience, or realization. Rather, it seems these different explanatory strategies specify different 
causal influences on the behavioral phenomenon in question (which may or may not also bear causal 
relationships to one another). This result is easy to replicate with other instances of multiple 
investigations targeting the same phenomenon; Potochnik (2010) argues this is the general form of the 
relationship between competing “levels” of explanation in science.5 Ylikoski (2014) argues that, in the 
social sciences, there are multiple types of social explanations, explanations that do not come in levels.  
 
5 Franklin-Hall, 2016, calls this relationship ‘horizontal’ rather than ‘vertical’; terminology that reinforces 
an expectation of dependence of higher-level wholes on their lower-level parts.  
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At first glance, it seems genetics might fare better, with the anticipated dependence relations 
connecting explanations in molecular genetics to those in classical genetics. This is because these 
investigations invoke different specifications (structural and functional, roughly) of the very same 
entities (genes). But the styles of explanations formulated in molecular genetics and classical genetics do 
not capitalize on that relationship. Rather, molecular genetics provides information about molecular 
genes associated with some trait of interest, often via genome-wide association studies. Very seldom is 
the causal role of any given molecular gene able to be identified. And classical genetic explanations, as 
in behavioral genetics, partition overall influence on a trait into genetic heritability vs. environmental 
influences. So, despite the apparent promise, molecular genetics and classical genetics are not well 
positioned to provide candidate explanations citing straightforwardly related entities or properties. The 
upshot of this discussion is that entities and properties featured in a variety of potential scientific 
explanations for the same or related phenomena in scientific research generally bear no special 
relationship (such as composition, realization, determination, or supervenience) to one another.  
This finding also interferes with the expectation that higher-level explanations are more general 
than lower-level explanations, as that expectation of relative generality issues from the anticipation of a 
many-one relationship between the relevant entities or properties as expected with multiple realization, 
supervenience, determination, and composition. There is also a deeper problem beyond this. The 
generality of an explanation depends on its degree of abstractness, i.e. how many details are specified. 
Specifying fewer details or only limited relations results in a more general account, while incorporating 
more details decreases the generality (and increases the precision) of an account. But degree of 
abstractness is a property of representations, or characterizations, not of what is being represented or 
characterized. Generality, as in scope of applicability, might be a metaphysical property, but the relative 
generality of an explanation is influenced by representational choices, namely what to include or 
exclude from the explanation.  
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Two implications of this are important for present purposes. First, the abstractness or generality 
of an explanation needn’t follow from the metaphysical dependence relations typically used to 
articulate levels of organization, such as composition, realization, and supervenience (Potochnik, 
forthcoming).6 By specifying additional properties or omitting mention of other factors (e.g.), one can 
make an explanation more or less general regardless of what entities and properties it features. Thus, an 
explanation featuring entities or properties on a lower level of organization may be more or less general 
than an explanation featuring entities or properties on a higher level of organization. Any representation 
can be made more or less abstract, thereby rending the account more or less general. Atomic bonds can 
be represented quite schematically, and many details can be specified about high-level entities like 
Fiona, the hippo with by far the lowest birthweight to ever survive, famously born at the Cincinnati Zoo 
(even without saying anything at all about lower-level entities or properties). Indeed, in other contexts 
philosophers have regularly touted the relative generality of accounts in physics vs. the so-called special 
sciences.  
The second implication of abstractness being representational that I want to emphasize is that it 
is quite common to have incommensurate degrees of generality—i.e. two representations that cannot 
be ranked in their generality but simply are general in different respects. Abstractness (and thus 
generality) is achieved by omitting details. Omit details about different things or, put another way, 
include details about different things and the resulting representations are of incommensurate 
generality. They specify different aspects of the world in virtue of what is depicted and generalize to 
different ranges of circumstances in virtue of what is omitted. Philosophers (including me) have had 
 
6 The determination relation seems more closely related to generality but also more distantly related to 
levels of organization and thus levels of explanation as they have often been understood. Franklin-Hall 
(2016) acknowledges this by pointing out the divergence between determinate/determinable and 
micro/macro yet persists in calling the determinate/determinable relation “vertical”—which to my mind 
continues the conflation of fineness of specification and compositional determination that I aim to 
disambiguate here.  
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much to say about the proper degree and variety of generality in our scientific explanations, but that is 
incidental to the present point. The point about generality in explanations I am making here is simply 
that varieties of potential explanations quite often cannot be ranked by degree of generality, so this 
element of the levels of explanation framing fails to obtain on a regular basis.  
Finally, let’s consider the very basis of framing varieties of potential explanations as levels of 
explanation: whether potential explanations for a given explanandum are arranged in a linear hierarchy 
or partial hierarchy. The delineation of levels requires that potential explanations be sortable into lower-
level-than, higher-level-than, or same-level-as; if one anticipates a partial ordering rather than linear 
hierarchy, a fourth category of “incommensurate level” is also available. The argument above that 
potential scientific explanations of the same phenomenon often are not related by citing entities or 
properties related straightforwardly by composition, realization, supervenience, or determination 
already suggests difficulties with sorting potential explanations into a linear hierarchy, as those are 
typically cited as the basis for delineating levels. Even if one aims for a partial ordering, the large size of 
the “incommensurate level” category is troubling, if—as I have argued—most or all potential 
explanations for the same explanandum are not straightforwardly related by composition, realization, 
supervenience, or determination. This suggests that, for many of our candidate scientific explanations, 
the anticipated means for sorting into levels are unavailable.  
The problem goes deeper. As I have explored elsewhere, a variety of relations including material 
and mechanistic composition, spatial and temporal scale, and realization have been taken to jointly 
define levels of organization, but it turns out that these relations together do not determine a linear 
hierarchy or useful partial ordering (Potochnik, 2017, Chapter 6) and any individual relation among them 
cannot be used separately to determine a linear hierarchy or useful partial ordering (Potochnik, 
forthcoming). I want to emphasize that the problem is not that there are occasional exceptions to an 
ordering or orderings that cannot be universal in scope. Rather, it seems our world—or at least the 
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properties and entities into which science has carved it—simply is not composed of levels (see also 
Thomasson, 2014; Eronen, 2015). Indeed, when Kim (2002)—a philosopher perhaps best known for a 
causal exclusion argument that presumes the levels framework—explored the basis for levels, even he 
came up short.  
The commitments I take the levels framework to have and the difficulties I have pointed out 
with each of these commitments are summarized in Table 1. If levels of organization cannot be used to 
impose a linear hierarchy on our explanations, and generality rankings of our varieties of explanation do 
not result in a linear hierarchy, and the varieties of potential scientific explanations we observe in situ 
do not seem to bear any of the anticipated hierarchical relationships to one another, then I am not sure 
what the basis would be for the presumption that scientific explanations come in levels. 
Commitments of the view that explanations 
come in levels 
Difficulties with these commitments 
Explanation varieties arranged in linear hierarchy Incommensurate rankings are commonplace 
Higher-level explanations are more general than 
lower-level explanations 
Abstractness is a representational, not 
metaphysical, property 
Higher-level explanations cite something that 
depends on what lower-level explanations cite 
Potential explanations often bear no special 
relationship to one another  
Table 1 : Commitments of the view that potential explanations come in levels and the difficulties facing 
them 
 
It follows from all of this that we should pause to consider the proper framing before employing 
the seemingly straightforward diagrams of level relations that recurs in many discussions of levels of 
explanation and causation. Figure 1 depicts an important example of such a diagram; another primary 
example is the diagram commonly used to depict the causal exclusion argument that originated with 
Kim (e.g. 1998). The vertical lines illustrating realization or supervenience may seem to be 
uncontroversial in light of the broad acceptance of physicalism and material composition, but these 
commitments do not suffice as grounds for the assertion that our scientific explanations or the causal 
relationships they feature bear the implied metaphysical relationships to one another. Those vertical 
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lines must be earned rather than assumed, lest the very framing of the question inherit our mistaken 
assumptions about the variety of potential scientific explanations.  
Philosophical discussions about explanatory reductionism have, by and large, presumed 
explanations come in levels, identified candidate explanations on the basis of that expectation, and then 
assessed quality and status of those candidate explanations to make a determination regarding 
reductionism. The debate is transformed if instead we look to science to see what varieties of potential 
explanations for the same phenomena are identified and what relationship those bear to one another. 
One favoring the standard strategy might argue that that approach gets at a metaphysically deeper 
picture of alternative explanations or that, in the fullness of time, varieties of scientific explanation will 
tend toward the predicted relationship of levels. In response to the former, I’ll point out that so long as 
the target of our philosophical accounts of explanation is scientific explanations, the better strategy is 
one that applies to explanations actually formulated in science. In response to the latter, I see no reason 
to expect that science is moving toward a division of labor ordered by metaphysical relationships like 
composition, realization, or supervenience. This expectation is supported by similar considerations as 
those I have already raised in this section with framing antireductionism about explanation in terms of 
levels.    
 
3. Antireductionism Without Levels 
Conceptualizing antireductionism in terms of levels systematically misconstrues the relationship 
different candidate explanations bear to one another. Candidate explanations do seem to relate many-
one to their explanantia, as anticipated with the levels framing. Potential explanations come in varieties. 
But, as discussed in the previous section, “levels” is not an apt description for those varieties. The 
relationship potential explanations of the same phenomena bear to one another is not a linear hierarchy 
orderable by generality and defined by metaphysical dependence of the featured entities and 
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properties. In this section, I use the shortcomings of the levels framing to inspire an alternative 
approach to antireductionism. This alternative approach better describes the variety of candidate 
explanations we see in scientific research and the relationships these explanations bear to one another, 
and it also better accounts for the considerations that guide the selection among candidate 
explanations. I discuss these three significances below. I conclude this section by pointing to some 
problematic downstream implications to which framing antireductionism in terms of levels has given 
rise and, accordingly, an antireductionism without levels helps us avoid.  
 First, having jettisoned the expectations that accompanied the levels framing, let’s reconsider 
how different potential explanations of the same explanantia relate to one another. In Section 2, I 
anticipated an alternative to straightforward metaphysical dependence (whether composition, 
determination, supervenience, or realization): namely, that different explanatory strategies specify 
different causal influences on the phenomenon in question, influences that may or may not also bear 
causal relationships to one another (see also Potochnik, 2010). Just as attention to in situ varieties of 
scientific explanations revealed that the levels framing is frequently inapt, this also lends prima facie 
support to this alternative framing. Consider again the variety of investigations that aim to explain 
human behavioral tendencies. These can feature (at least) molecular genes, neurological features, 
environmental influences, social context, and more. These factors interact in their influence on human 
behavior, and some also causally influence one another, as with molecular genes’ and the environment’s 
impact on neurological development.  
 This example supports an additional consideration in favor of the expectation of different 
potential explanations targeting distinct influences on a phenomenon. In a wide variety of scientific 
research, factors that are non-local turn out to be key influences on phenomena. This amounts to an 
empirical vindication of at least one form of antireductionism: it turns out that large-scale influences, 
distal influences, and structural influences regularly shape the happenings in our world. Examples are 
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easy to generate. In ecology, abundance (i.e. population sizes) traditionally was thought to be 
determined locally by interactions with competitors but is now recognized to be shaped globally, such as 
in the evolution of specialists and generalists (e.g. Gaston and Blackburn 2000). Dynamical systems 
theory has been fruitfully applied to research ranging from physics to ecology, cancer, and cognitive 
science. And it is now widely appreciated that mitigating racism involves not just changing minds but 
renovating social systems. The potential for significant non-local influence means there are more places 
to look for explanations and less reason to think independently generated explanations bear any 
metaphysically deep relationships to one another, e.g., by citing different specifications of the same 
influences. Individuals’ racist views may causally influence the features of social systems, and similarly 
for interspecific competition and evolutionary trajectories, but in neither case do the former compose, 
realize, or determine the latter.  
 Debates about explanatory reduction have tended to conflate two questions, roughly: (1) how 
finely (i.e. at what “level”) explanatory factors should be characterized, and (2) whether explanatory 
factors tend to be local and small, perhaps even components of the system exhibiting the phenomenon 
to be explained (i.e. components at “lower levels”). Scientific research has empirically shown (2) to be 
wrong: explanations cite the distant, the largescale, and the structural in order to shed light on a variety 
of phenomena. This outcome should lead us to shift our gaze outward rather than down, so to speak, 
when looking for candidate explanations. And that, in turn, leads the first question of reductionism, (1) 
above, to seem rather beside the point. If entirely different factors are targeted in different candidate 
explanations, then the question of how finely to characterize a factor does not arise. This relates to the 
point I made in the previous section that, when we consider candidate explanations actually generated 
in scientific research, they turn out not to be clearly related by determination, realization, 
supervenience, or composition.  
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Second, the framing of levels also suggests candidate explanations are less numerous than they 
in fact are. Looking merely to components on lower organizational levels suggests we will have, at most, 
the number of explanations as there are levels. When we shift our gaze outward instead of down, as I 
suggested just above, shifting our antireductionist expectation from levels to varieties of influences, this 
opens the door to the recognition of a wider variety of candidate explanations. Candidate explanations, 
it seems, may be as numerous as factors that significantly bear on the phenomenon—or even as 
numerous as various partially overlapping sets of these factors that may be targeted in different 
investigations. Such candidate explanations differ not just in what factors are cited but also (as a result) 
in what circumstances or to what varieties of phenomena they apply. This is anticipated by what I said in 
Section 2 about representations with incommensurate generality, that is, that generalize across 
different ranges of circumstances. Indeed, this is hardly surprising when we take into account the 
different research projects within which different explanations are formulated.  
For example, explaining some phenotypic trait, say, variation in coloration in Harris sparrows, 
can take place in the context of research into frequency-dependence selection, with an explanation that 
bears on this as an instance of the hawk-dove game dynamics (Maynard Smith, 1984). Or an explanation 
may be generated in research on phenotypic plasticity, with an explanation that bears on this as an 
instance of environmental influence on trait development. (See Potochnik, 2016, for a more extended 
discussion of this example.) There are many more possibilities beyond these two: explaining trait 
variation within a population is of interest in a number of biology research programs. And, nothing is 
special about this example: relevance across multiple research projects and variable significance for 
those research projects is common for phenomena scientists aim to explain. In the levels framework for 
antireductionism, generality is touted as an advantage for high-level explanation.  
Third, this wide variety of candidate explanations and how they relate also complicates the 
grounds for deciding among the candidates. Classically, for antireductionism couched in terms of levels 
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of explanation, advantages like generality, breadth, and stability have been touted as grounds for 
preferring non-reductive explanations. (For some recent discussions, see Weslake, 2010; Blanchard et 
al., 2018; Bradley, 2020.) I have suggested that, if varieties of explanation do not come in levels and do 
not bear special relationships to one another, then candidate explanations cannot be straightforwardly 
ordered with regards to generality. For antireductionism without levels, different varieties of generality 
suit explanations to contribute to different research projects, with different aims. We should not expect 
an across-the-board ordering for any other measures that may be relevant to an explanation’s quality. 
Similar considerations may still play a role in determining which candidate explanation(s) fits the bill. 
But, given the ease of generating potential explanations with different forms of generality (i.e. that 
generalize to different ranges of systems), it is possible or even likely that such considerations will vary 
with the requirements of different research projects. The question may not be which explanation is 
most general, stable, or offers greatest breadth or guidance, but rather which explanation has these 
properties in the right combination and regarding the right features to be most valuable to a specific 
research project.  
If this is so, then this suggests a form of explanatory pluralism: One single explanation may not 
win out against all other candidates, but rather multiple explanations may be developed across science, 
each of which best addresses some research needs but not others. This is different from an explanatory 
pluralism developed within the levels framework, such as by Jackson and Pettit (1992) and Sober (1999), 
as those views adopt the expectation of levels of explanation ordered by relative generality and urge 
pluralism with regards to how much generality is desirable. Note that one might follow my urging to 
reframe antireductionism without a commitment to such an explanatory pluralism: one may hold that 
there is always a single, best explanation that is non-reductive in the ways I have outlined (perhaps a 
single, integrative explanation that draws from all relevant research projects). On the other hand, if one 
does accept explanatory pluralism of this form, then this opens up a significant role for scientists’ 
 21 
interests and priorities in shaping the nature of scientific explanations—due to what they emphasize and 
what they sideline in their particular research projects. This is explored for varieties of explanation in 
cognitive science by Potochnik and Sanches de Oliveira (2020), who call this different “explanatory 
styles”.   
To summarize, a better antireductionism about explanation stems from the insights that 
different potential explanations regularly feature entirely different factors influencing the phenomenon, 
that these potential explanations vary in what they attend to and what they abstract from as they are 
developed in and contribute to different research programs, and that grounds for deciding among these 
potential explanations include considerations that may also vary with different research programs and 
perhaps even with something as basic as scientists’ interests. The antireductionism comes in granting 
the legitimacy of at least some of these potential explanations that do not feature local microphysical 
happenings. Explanatory pluralism results from additionally asserting that multiple of these potential 
explanations are warranted for a single phenomenon (as characterized in some explanandum).  
Nowhere in this is reference to levels needed, and, I propose, such reference would actually be a 
liability. An antireductionism based on levels fails to incorporate these features and is impoverished by 
the absence. Further, even if the points made in this section are somehow accommodated, the levels 
framing remains problematic for philosophical debates about scientific explanation. Such a framing 
easily can lead to a slide into the presumptions I argued against in Section 2. This framing is also 
associated with other problematic and unearned ideas. For one, antireductionism based on levels of 
explanation has been taken to suggest that explanandum and explanans should be on the same “level,” 
that is, regard similarly sized objects operating at similar timescales (e.g. Wimsatt, 1972; 2007). This may 
work as a defense against reductionism, but it also defines away the possibility of large-scale and 
structural causes—and, for that matter, the possibility of tiny entities occasionally wielding great 
explanatory power. An instance of this is individualism in social science, where behavior is expected to 
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be fully explained by the properties of individuals; see Haslanger (2015) for an argument against 
individualism in favor of structural explanation, or explaining behavior with reference to systems in 
which individuals participate. The expectation that explanations should match the level of what is being 
explained is clearly wrong. As discussed above, scientific explanations regularly cite the distant, the 
largescale, and the structural in order to shed light on a variety of phenomena, as with structural 
explanation in the social sciences. It is a further liability of the levels framework that it obscures this in 
order to counter the view that all explanations trace back to microphysical happenings.  
 
4. A New Working Hypothesis about Scientific Explanation 
Oppenheim and Putnam’s (1954) stance and Fodor’s (1974) rebuttal were both explicitly formulated as 
‘working hypotheses’ about how the relevance of levels will play out in science: The former reductive 
unity, the latter independence of levels of realization. Both working hypotheses, I submit, have been 
proven wrong by scientific advances. At this point, there is ample scientific evidence in favor of 
antireductionism about scientific explanations. With few if any exceptions, the so-called special sciences 
continue about their business, indifferent to any breakthroughs in microphysics, and the explanations 
they produce are not treated as provisional, awaiting vindication by reduction. But, just as importantly, 
there is also ample scientific evidence that explanations don’t come in levels. Different fields and 
subfields that target the same phenomena focus on different factors that by and large bear no 
straightforward metaphysical relationship to one another, and largescale and systemic factors can be 
key to explaining many phenomena.  
 Both previous working hypotheses—reductionism and levels of explanation—share starting 
presumptions about how our world operates that turn out to be wrong. Both of these philosophical 
positions presume that the key to explaining phenomena is their features, their immediate causes, and 
perhaps what composes them; we might call this ‘localism’ about explanation. Thus, the choice in 
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explanation has been framed as between on-site microphysical happenings or lumpier characterizations 
of those happenings. But that is just not how our world is structured. Phenomena are regularly 
determined by largescale and distant factors, by structural and contextual factors, by systems in which 
they participate. Abundant scientific and philosophical research supports this claim, including 
complexity research such as the aforementioned dynamical systems theory, developmental systems 
theory, systems biology, and network theory. Recall from above that one of the entry points for the 
levels framework in philosophy was in Herbert Simon’s work on complexity. Historically, at least in that 
tradition, positing non-reductive levels of explanation was a way to accommodate complexity. But since 
then, the levels framework and complexity research have parted ways: the former has retained a 
commitment to localism about explanation, while the latter is predicated on its rejection. And rightly so, 
it seems to me: Localism about explanation is demonstrably false.  
 This inspires the new working hypothesis I propose about scientific explanation. In accordance 
with the view outlined in Section 3, I propose that prospective explanations are many and varied, often 
including some featuring large-scale, distant, and structural influences. The decision is not about how 
fine-grained our characterization of local factors should be, but rather which factors at what scales we 
should attend to. This might have at least some objective determiners, but I suspect some of the 
determination will be left to what scientists and their audiences prioritize, intentionally or not, via the 
specific research projects scientists pursue. This characterization fits better than either reductionism or 
antireductionist levels with the variety of potential explanations encountered in scientific research and 
with how those candidate explanations relate to one another.  
The two diagrams of levels featured in above figures have held remarkable sway over our field, 
so I have tried to offer a competing image in Figure 3. It is more mundane: a failure to draw lines to 
demarcate levels or arrows to demarcate metaphysical determination relationships just shows up as 
blank page. Aside from what this image does not include, the important features are (1) that the 
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explanandum is grouped with multiple different sets of related phenomena, (2) that those groupings are 
associated with the identification of different explanatory factors, and (3) these different explanatory 
factors bear no determinate relationship to one another (at least not in general). E is the explanandum; 
X, Y, and Z are factors that comprise candidate explanations for E.  
 Figure 3: Antireductionism of explanation as a thesis about different explanatory factors operating at 
different scales 
 
Here is a brief example to illustrate this characterization. What explains the scarlet ibis’s bright 
coloration? (We could additionally specify the contrast class: rather than the white feathers of the 
closely related white ibis.) One candidate explanation focuses on scarlet ibis’s ability to metabolize 
carotenoids. This highlights a primary form of coloration across bird species. Another candidate 
explanation focuses on the specific carotenoid carrier protein found in the scarlet ibis’s blood. Yet 
another candidate explanation postulates the role of the scarlet ibis’s vibrant coloration in mate 
attraction. Each of these is the subject of scientific research. Each distinguishes the scarlet ibis’s 
coloration from that of the white ibis. Each casts light on a different range of related phenomena: from 
avian coloration in general, to the scarlet ibis’s particular metabolism, to the role of bright coloration in 
sexual selection. See Figure 4. They are not competing explanations: one or another may turn out not to 
be exactly right, but it’s possible that all are correct. Depending on the specifics of our account of 
explanation, we may require more to be said about one or another for it to count as an explanation, 
favor one over others, or even anticipate the integration of these considerations in a single explanation. 
However, I think the most likely outcome—and what best accommodates the realities of scientific 
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investigation—is that all three of these explanations are accepted (or suitably refined versions if new 
evidence comes to light). But regardless of this, the point for present purposes is that the choice among 
potential explanations is not how finely to characterize the local details but rather at what scale and 
targeting which factors to pitch the investigation. Antireduction about explanation is correct—but only if 
we endorse the right version.  
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